Utilitarianism As A Long-Term Project

Something which I have grappled when it comes to the writings of Mill is his inference that human beings seek pleasure, and, therefore, human beings ought to seek pleasure. This is a clear case of inferring an ought from an is. An appeal to the general psychology of humans would seem to persuade us to accept this, and rightly it would seem that demanding anything moral from us is unreasonable (why would I do anything if it did not in some way please me?). Further, it would often appear that any system that does not offer a telos holds not substantive reason for anyone to participate in it, and even if the system has a telos it must be one which is desirable.  Here, the ought from an is grounds its legitimacy.

But, still further, I had concerns over this newly founded inference. Though Mill argues convincingly for higher pleasures which are above that of more basic pleasures akin to those of animals, and this prevents a crude hedonism; he argues that the moral rules regarding the [social] whole are composed of the combination of all the moral rules made by individuals for particular cases.

Here Mill argues that there is both a social order (justice) that will develop, which will require individuals to conform to it, to protect pleasure; and secondly, and more importantly, there is an innate sympathy in humans for each other. Without this capacity they are not able to fully function as moral beings. Mill further argues that they will not conform to any moral system without this trait.

Therefore, I am returned to the beginning of the work in which he criticizes other moral system for their bleak conception of human nature which essentially does not give humans the benefit of the doubt that they are, in fact, good. And, here, the implicit concern that his system of individually driven desires for pleasure does not allow for consideration of certain relationships (such as those that may not seem inherently beneficial to the individual) seems alleviated by at least allowing them to exist. In other words, humans are naturally inclined to feel sympathetic toward one another and will therefore be driven to treat others in certain ways so as to avoid pain or induce pleasure which would be considered moral.

However, a great deal of this claim relies on the premise that humans naturally have sympathy – which is not to say this is wrong – and that it prompts them to want a common good for all humans; and further that, though sympathy may be degraded or robbed in some manner by institutions and the organization of society, it only requires reform to allow it to be free and greater well being achieved.

Having this understood, I must ask the question as to whether utilitarianism, as a long term social project that does rely on any objective criteria – except that humans seek pleasure – can be judged accurately. The basis for such a judgment would have to rely on the long-term examination of its effects on a whole and, supposedly, it cannot be reasoned alone that it will be a better moral philosophy as it only holds that humans will do good to attain happiness, not necessarily they will do.

This is not to say that Mill’s project is pointless, but it certainly seems meticulous and difficult to ascertain its value, and, therefore, can we be sure it is right? And if we can, is there perhaps not a more concise way to achieve similar or greater results?

I would like to know what others think – particularly if I have misinterpreted a part of Mill’s philosophy. Feel free to comment below.