A common misconception about Utilitarianism is that it is
impersonal and does not care whether one or another person is happy but that
there is an aggregate happiness to be had. I understand the dismissal of the
theory on these grounds; after all, Mill’s description focuses on the (somewhat
fallacious) idea that aggregate happiness – and therefore laws of how to
promote this happiness – are composed of nothing more than individual happiness
– and therefore individual laws made in accordance with the greatest happiness
principle. So it might not matter if person B is happy as long as person A is
that much more happy – or seemingly so at least. More worrisome is that, by
this logic, people are nothing more than measures of happiness – or containers
of happiness, if you prefer – and, as long as the aggregate happiness stays the
same or increases, it does not matter what happens to an individual person.
This is something that came up in the symposium we had in class, and I believe
it is important to point out what is the real aim of utilitarianism in regards to
this to avoid an erroneous dismissal of its value as a moral philosophy.
The perceived impersonality of Mill’s utilitarianism is, in
fact, purposeful. In Mill’s mind it serves to effectively make an impartial system.
Though it is not necessary to have an impersonal theory to provide impartiality
toward every individual, the impartiality assure that no person’s happiness is
valued as greater than another – and therefore aggregate happiness is not
disproportionately affected by a few individuals. He did, however, think it was
nonsensical to claim that individuals aim toward the happiness of the whole
over themselves. And here is a main concern that many have, is that laws made
to promote the happiness of the whole based on the laws individuals make to
promote individual happiness would seem to not only be contradictory but also
destructive.
This concern is born out a failure by Mill to explicitly state
that is human sympathy – our compassion for our family, friends, lovers, etc. –
is something that we not only possess but that affects our happiness.
Therefore, we will fashion laws not only for ourselves but additionally for the
sake of those we are sympathetic toward.
So, humans may not be individual agents in the sense that no
particular agent has more value placed on their happiness than another, but
this does not make utilitarianism unfeeling. Rather, utilitarianism puts all of
its faith in humanity and compassion as the means by which the greatest
happiness for the greatest number may be achieved.
I'm not going to lie, I was drawn to this post due to the Buffy reference in your title, but I think you bring up a valid point about how Mill disregards human sympathy as factor that plays an important role in determining individual happiness. For example, many people will engage in philanthropic activities because they sympathize with those in need, and by doing good for others they become happier, while also bettering the community (the greater good). It should also be addressed that our sympathy can greatly reduce happiness. What if in the doctor problem we chose to save the 5 and sacrifice the 1, but the remaining 5 felt guilty for taking another's organs and their remaining lives became unhappy. In this case the 'normal' utilitarian calculus would have been incorrect due to the 5 survivor's emotions, as saving the many would not produce the greatest happiness for the greatest amount of people,
ReplyDeleteThis post illustrates one of the greatest complexities of Utilitarianism: which aspects of a person's overall feeling happiness are applied to the Greatest Happiness Principle? Is sympathy included? What about the warm fuzzy feeling you get when you rescue a puppy from the street? To what extents do (or should) all the varying factors that play into our individual happiness contribute to the overall happiness of both ourselves and society at large? It seems to me, especially after this post, that Mill believes that there is no "perfect" ratio for the varying factors that add up to happiness, although he does give sympathy quite a lot of power to serve as the motivation for people to attempt to make the world a just place.
ReplyDeleteI wonder what Kant thinks about sympathy. If what's been said is true (which I believe so far is), then Mill values human feelings while Kant dismisses them. When Kant dismisses the moral value of sympathy, he puts emphasis on duty, which he argues is what grants an action moral value. However, how do we have the duty in the first place? Doesn't Kant reason up the three categorical imperatives with sympathy in mind? To make sense with Kant, one has to try to empty out all the feelings of sympathy and compassion. However, is that even possible? Maybe the "reason" behind the CI is not rationality, but the intention for everyone to be happy (which for Kant may mean having the ability to fully exercise reason). I argue with Mill that we should take into account the moral value of sympathy and compassion which urge us to make moral choices. Without those feelings, we can only theorize but cannot act.
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