Resolve the Naturalistic Fallacy at the Cost of Our Animal Friends

The question whether Mill is committing the naturalistic fallacy came up in class. Mill argues in his essay Utilitarianism that the proof of the principle of utility consists in that human nature desires happiness and means of happiness. Happiness is the “sole end of human action” and the moral worth of an action is judged by how much happiness is cause by it (39). This appears to be an instance of naturalistic fallacy, where Mill moves from an “is” – that our human nature is to pursue happiness, to the “ought” – that we should do what promotes the most happiness. Is there any way out of this tricky situation? One defense is that Mill’s different kinds of pleasures shows that it is in human nature to have the potential to desire all kinds of pleasures, rather than to pursue pleasures; however this nature is corruptible. The humans who have enjoyed the higher kind of pleasures are able to say that higher pleasures count more than lower pleasures, and therefore human actions should aim to maximize higher pleasures, which are good in themselves.

Mill declares that most human beings desire to be rational rather than being changed into a beast (9). Mill is aware that as rational beings, we realize that we are imperfect, and therefore we are dissatisfied (10). Mill implies a Platonic description of pleasure here: the philosophers are the ones who know all the kinds of pleasures, including the pleasure that comes from learning. All other kinds of people have not experienced the highest pleasure. Therefore, the one who has known the most kinds of pleasures is the best judge in what the best pleasure is. Using a line of thinking similar to Plato’s, Mill declares that the utilitarian happiness/utility does not consist purely in contentment – a being who experience the higher pleasures are in fact generally not content. It is not, however, truly in our human nature that we pursue higher pleasures. Mill is aware that there are way more people who prefer basic pleasures over higher ones. He declares that our society tends to destroy the ability to pursue and enjoy higher pleasures in young people: growing up in an environment that values basic pleasures renders people capable of only inferior pleasures (11). From this claim, we can see that Mill is not simply saying that people in their nature pursue higher pleasures, therefore we ought to pursue higher pleasures. He is giving an assumptions about human nature that says humans have the potential to find pleasure in all the different levels. What separates us from animals is our potential to find pleasure in the intellect, which is good. Therefore, in order to be more human, we need to practice the attainment of intellectual pleasures. These intellectual pleasures direct us to understand that moral rightness comes from choosing to do something that maximizes the happiness of all concerned. It is not that all humans naturally act upon the greatest happiness principle: that the happiness of all (i.e. the promotion of capabilities for the intellect in all) is more important than selfish concerns. Most of us, such as Miley Cyrus, are part of the corrupting culture that makes us only understand lower pleasures, and become more selfish, and less utilitarian.

In this interpretation of Mill, there is no room for animals. Animals have in their nature to lack the potential to appreciate higher pleasures, therefore they are unfit to be considered the subjects of moral concerns. This seems to suggest that the cruelty in the use of animal models for scientific experiments has moral impunity. How do you think Mill could respond to this objection? Do you think Mill is in fact committing a naturalistic fallacy in claiming that the proof of the greatest happiness principle resides in our human nature?