This week,
we looked at Aristotle’s Nicomachean
Ethics as well as the philosophy of Epicureanism. Before I enter into my
discussion, I want to give a rather simplified overview of my understandings of
each of these philosophies.
Aristotle’s
idea of ethics is centered on his understanding of virtue, which he defines as
a mean, between two extremes, relative to us, as defined reasonably by a
reasonable person (and if I got that wrong Dr. J would slap me after we
repeated it so many times in class). Essentially, a virtuous action is one that
avoids excess or deficiency that a reasonable person would take in a given
situation.
On the
other hand, Epicureanism centers on a life that chases “the magnitude of
pleasure [which] reaches its limit in the removal of pain.” For Epicurus, then,
pleasure is not simply an enjoyable feeling, but the complete absence of pain.
Furthermore, Epicurus believes, “It is impossible to live a pleasant life
without living wisely and well and justly, and it is impossible to live wisely
and well and justly without living pleasantly.”
Given the
differing views of virtue of the two philosophers, it should not come as a
surprise that they also differ in how one attains virtue. Aristotle believes
that one must repeatedly practice living according to the mean. Epicurus, while
he doesn’t explicitly state this, seems to believe that if one performs and
actions and make choices that bring one true pleasure, virtue will follow.
While these are very, very basic summaries of the views, they give enough of a
picture for me to illustrate the problem that I found with both of them.
In short,
it seems to me that both Aristotelian and Epicurean ethics seem to be only a
small step away from moral relativism, essentially allowing any action to be
considered ethical under the right circumstances. For Aristotle, a virtuous
action is necessarily relative to the person performing the action, which, as
pointed out in the post below entitled “You’re Saying I can Kill Someone
Aristotle?”, could very easily reach a point at which such an action is
considered ethical (As a side note, I saw that post after starting this one,
and I highly recommend you read it – great discussion on a smaller aspect of my
larger post).
Now,
consider Epicurus. His model of virtue is based on what, in each person’s mind,
is wise, well, and just, and therefore pleasurable. The problem, though, is
that each person’s perception of wisdom, wellness, and justice will vary, and,
at least to my understanding of his Principal
Doctrines, Epicurus seems to take those definitions for granted.
Furthermore, he states that it is impossible to live pleasurably without also
living “wisely and well and justly,” but I would argue that it is entirely
possible for a person to achieve the absence of pain with the absence of either
of those three, even if for the simple reason that a person’s upbringing alone
could very easily distort how actions affect a person’s reactions to them, e.g.
whether they bring pleasure or pain.
So what do
you think? Am I oversimplifying these ideas? Missing a key point? Spot on? I’d
love to hear thoughts on this.
I agree that Epicurus may be missing the mark with his definition of "virtue," by making certain characteristics dependent upon each other for the satisfaction of his definition. I do not believe it is reasonable to qualify a "pleasurable life" as a necessarily virtuous life, or vice versa. I know plenty of people who lead pleasurable lives but do not satisfy the conditions of being "wise or just" in their actions. Since Epicurus emphasizes his belief that the best reflection of a person's character is that person's actions, my observation of people leading pleasurable yet unjust lives is particularly significant.
ReplyDeleteAn example that springs to mind is the character Veruca, in Charlie in the Chocolate Factory. She certainly leads what one might consider a "pleasurable" and indeed a charmed life by way of materialistic satisfaction, yet her actions reflect neither wisdom nor justice. I could be missing the mark myself in making the distinction between a "wise, just" life and a "pleasurable" life as separate sorts of lives that are neither necessarily virtuous in nature nor dependent upon one another. Thoughts?
I, for one, am additionally concerned about the moral relativism on both accounts. However, to argue that the Epicurean conception of a pleasurable life is without virtue in its original conception is a tougher argument to make than perhaps it has been give credit.
ReplyDeleteCertainly one can have pleasure without pain and have no virtue, but I would be hard-pressed to argue that Epicurus intended it to be so. This is why he split desires into the three categories of natural and necessary, simply natural, and empty. Empty desires are those that are derived from immortality and humans have no need for. These, therefore, encompass desires for power; wealth; honor; and even death because though these desires exist they satisfy no need nor do they have a means to be completely satisfied by and only continually cause anguish as a result. Natural desires are those that are simple and easily satisfied. Natural but unnecessary desires, as they are better known, encompass wants for pleasant smell and good food; they are easily satisfied but are not necessary to our well being. By comparison, natural and necessary desires are those which affect our well being which include: our happiness, physical health, and life [itself].
There is still some ambiguity here, but I believe in Epicurus' mind we should recognize that those desires which are necessary and natural bring about virtue because we do not exist in isolation and must therefore strive for these virtues as a part of larger community/whole. We want to be just or wise because it brings us pleasure -- and not simply because we are so, but -- as the result of being able to function more agreeably in society.
Again, I do not think this system is free form relativism, but these are points to be considered in making the argument against it.
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ReplyDeleteYou present a good point bringing up someones upbringing to be factored into Epicurus' view of the removal of pain to be the ideal life because someones outlook on things could greatly effect a persons perspective on something that is a great pleasure. Although I would like to bring in special biological cases such as if someone was afflicted with congenital analgesia, which is a neural disorder where the person cannot feel pain so would Epicurus view that as the ultimate virtue? Or would the danger this caused to the person harm their mental state enough that they constantly fear for their health and make it impossible to truly achieve aparaxia(freedom from fear) even thought they have achieved aponia (freedom from pain). If so, would one be more important than the other?
ReplyDeleteI agree with Jonathan's point about Epicureanism. While this philosophy can come off as excessively simple and morally relative, you have to have a greater understanding of what Epicurus truly meant when he claims that virtuous actions follow living a "pleasurable" life. On the outset, this sounds like moral relativism and, quite frankly, a bit absurd if one does not fully understand Epicurus's reasoning behind his entire philosophy. That is why Epicureanism gets thrown around in today's society as the "YOLO philosophy" (YOLO = "you only live once" for those of you living under a rock for the past year). But I do not believe this is what Epicurus intended. Again, like Jonathan commented, Epicurus separates the desires into three categories: the natural but necessary, natural but non-necessary, and the "vain and empty" desires. Isabelle brings up Veronica in Charlie and the Chocolate factory, but I'm pretty sure Epicurus would argue that most of her desires are vain and empty and do not bring her true pleasure. It is this separation of desires that ultimately demonstrates Epicurus' more detailed view of what is virtuous rather than his main and simple thesis that pleasure and the absence of pain is the path to virtue. This is often overlooked in his philosophy and what leads to, understandably, many misinterpretations.
ReplyDeleteOn the front of moral relativism, I would argue that neither Aristotle nor Epicurus intended for their philosophies to be interpreted this way (though I can see multiple objections and sympathize with many of them). Both make universal claims that connect all of humanity. For Epicurus, this is nature. He rests much of his philosophy on "natural" desires. Since Epicurus would argue that nature is the same for everyone, then everyone's virtue must, in a way, answer to this "nature", and therefore is not completely relative. For Aristotle, this is not nature but instead reason. In his definition of virtue, he argues that a virtue must be defined reasonably by a reasonable person. While he does say that virtue is relative for us, I think he only intends for this to be situationally and not universally. Since every human (for the sake of argument) is a rational creature, then he or she is connected on some universal level to which virtue cannot be classified as totally relative. Virtue answers to reason, like Epicurus' virtue answers to nature.