This has been my
first time studying Kant with any real depth. I find that I like many of his
ideas in The Groundwork for the
Metaphysics of Morals. As you all know one of the more popular thought
experiments we considered was the “axe murderer at your door”. What we focused
on was whether the act of lying to save a friend (or anyone else for that
matter) was right or wrong. We concluded that by Kant’s definition, lying in
all cases will be morally wrong because regardless of the consequences you
cannot will the maxim of lying as a universal law. Of course in the real world
there could potentially be several prudent reasons to lie, but still they would
be morally wrong.
One thing that
Kant says when he talks about the murderer at the door (sadly in this example
he/she is axe-less) is that if one lies to the murderer and the friend is
killed afterwards then you are legally held accountable, however, if you tell
the truth and your friend escapes without your knowledge then you are in the
clear. What I disliked about what Kant does here is that he seems, almost
intentionally, to avoid the scenario where you tell the truth, the murderer
walks in, and murders your friend. Now Kant does say that if one does their
duty, in this case telling the truth, then they cannot be held accountable by
the law (which I believe he means human law). Isn't it the case, though, that
in the truth = dead friend scenario you have directly influenced another moral
agent’s actions? Well in each scenario I think that one influences the
murderer’s actions, but if you tell the truth and your friend dies as a direct
result doesn't that make you an accomplice to the murder? I understand that by
telling the truth one has not committed an immoral action themselves; but by
telling the truth in this scenario you have allowed someone else to commit an
immoral action.
This is
consequentialist to a degree and so I feel that Kant would object by saying
that if one answers the murderer honestly then whatever happens after might as
well be considered accidents because you cannot be 100% certain what will
happen (for example the murderer is touched by your honesty and decides to
leave). But let’s give this murderer an axe, and let’s also say that this
murderer has made it clear that if he/she finds your friend, said friend shall
be axed (also we know for certain your friend will not be escaping because they
are a coward). It stands to say that it is pretty much certain that it’s no
accident that your friend dies if you tell the truth. I would ask: How is one
not morally responsible for the immoral actions of the murderer in this case? If
a Kantian would still not admit that the person who tells the truth and lets
their friend die has acted immorally, what do they think about a genocidal
leader? The leader may not actually kill anyone, but is the leader not at all
responsible for the many deaths that result as a consequence of his/her
influence?
In regards to the axe murderer at your door scenario, I would have to say that Kant's perception of morality is extremely distorted. When it comes to matters of life and death, any influence that one might have that ends up in the result of death is outright inhumane.Therefore, in a situation such as this, one would have to cast all morals aside and act in the best interest of one's self and one's friend. According to Kant, a person would not be morally responsible for allowing their friend to die at the hands of an axe murder, however, if we cast that perception of morality aside, it would be extremely immoral to do so, thus resulting in one's moral responsibility to do whatever it takes to prevent the consequence of death from happening. Yes, it's extremely consequential, yet it's necessary.
ReplyDelete- Jessica Ealy
But isn't that sort of reasoning faulty in itself? If we can just cast aside any morals we don't like for the greater good what's to keep the axe murderer from casting aside morals about killing for some greater good? (Ex. Killing your friend will result in one less mouth to feed, therefore reducing the world hunger crisis)
DeleteI agree with Justin on his understanding. We are dealing with a case of an extreme loss of morality and one that is designed to have no right answer. If you answer truthfully when the murderer inquires about your friend, then you have acted morally, but if it causes their death then you would at least feel in the wrong -- even if you tried to reason that it was morally right. Similarly, the inverse causes the best outcome -- prudentially -- but necessitates immorality. In this way, I believe Kant's description is based not in giving answers about what should be done but how to judge the morality of what we will. Therefore, this exercise is meant to have us find the conclusions as to what would be immoral or moral about our willing without telling us necessarily what we ought to do. Getting caught up in the fact the situation is a dilemma I think misses the point. The responsibility of the death is not alleviated because you told the truth. It is simply the case that by telling the truth, you have willed that people do not lie, but someone without morality -- such as the murderer -- is a moral outlier and it is for this reason that nothing one does (outside of having the good fortune of not having one's friend killed) results in a seeming immorality.
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