A Teological Interpretation of Kant's Moral Philosophy

It is clear that there is a deontological aspect to Kant’s moral philosophy, however, I wanted to explore the proposal of a Teleological interpretation most notably expressed by Barbara Herman in her work The Practice of Moral Judgment (1993) and first presented to me by the author Robert Johnson. As a refresher, Deontological ethics is a normative system – system for assessing rightness and wrongness of action in regard to what one ought to do (as opposed to what one does do or how one thinks about moral facts) – which regards which moral choices are “required,forbidden, or permitted.” In other words, it concerns itself with duty – what one ought to do derived from its accordance with a rule or set of rules – and not with what character one has or ought to have; or what would give the actor the best outcome. Something is teleological, by contrast, when it grounds its theories in the concepts of ends – such as the end of my action is the good or goodness, and therefore I act in accordance with that which will enable me to attain that end (goodness).

Now, my idea for the content of the end differs, but Herman’s argues (and this is very much paraphrased) that though Kant has duty as a part of his system, there is no rationale for an adherence to it unless it was the case that we will ourselves to follow it. In other words, what rational explanation can we have for doing one’s duty unless that in itself is good or valued and therefore willed by us? In response, a supporter of deontological ethics would most likely state that Kant insists that moral requirements are given their power by their nature of being willed by us, in so far as we are rational, and this is not contingent on the value that willing might have; but, as Johnson points out, how does this answer for the motivation of willing them in the first place? [Johnson, Robert, "Kant's Moral Philosophy", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy]

My inclination is to side with Paul Guyer that [our] autonomy is the value which causes us to will moral requirements [Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: Critical Essays. 1998]. I do not feel comfortable saying that I agree wholly with Guyer however, as I have yet to understand the intricacies of his arguments, but I can say that I believe that it is by result of the fact that we are autonomous beings (at least in Kant’s system), and we value that autonomy, that we suddenly must recognize a need to change our behavior – appeal to moral principles and so on  -- (whether for the individual it is the result of want to preserve our autonomy or out of a feeling of responsibility it may place upon us – both of which are derived from it as a valuable thing). In other words, I have a reverence for the law because I value my autonomy and will not will anyone else to not have autonomy as a universal maxim since that would contradict my own motivation/actions and I can not agree with such as a rational agent. In this light, it can therefore be argued that Kant’s ethics contains a teleological aspect (the value on our autonomy which motivates our will/maxims) and is not simply a system of deontological ethics (which would otherwise threaten the practicality of Kant’s moral philosophy and could be seen as quite hollow without regarding the importance of something that drives the will).

However, this is just the base argument which I believe still needs to fleshed out. What do you think? Is there any way we can argue to adhere to duty when we are not given a motive for the will to do its willing? Is autonomy that value which should be of most concern in a teleological interpretation of Kant? If you agree with me (and Herman and Guyer for that matter) how do you respond to the question of how the will's autonomy explains the authority of morality asked by Johnson?